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The stated thesis of Professor Fischel's Article,' that "courts
should rely more heavily on market prices when resolving valuation
disputes than has occurred to date,' 2 is important and largely persua-
sive. Judges are too quick to dismiss or to minimize the significance of
market evidence in determining valuation, including during appraisal
proceedings. Instead, courts have come to rely on valuation techniques
that are of dubious validity and are easily subject to manipulation by
interested parties.
But Professor Fischel's Article goes beyond its stated thesis and
makes a much more far-reaching argument: directors who authorize a
takeout transaction at a premium to the prevailing market price
should be immune from liability because public shareholders are not
entitled to anything more than the market value of their stock at that
moment, which represents the collective price level at which buyers
and sellers are willing to transact. But such a rule converts the willing
buyer/willing seller standard from a useful heuristic device to an abso-
lute standard that effectively guts the fiduciary obligation of corporate
directors, thereby significantly transforming the landscape of corpo-
rate law. This approach would not only deprive shareholders of an as-
set that is rightly theirs but also yield absurd results in certain circum-
stances.
I. MARKET EVIDENCE IN VALUING SECURITIES
Professor Fischel's basic thesis, that courts do not give sufficient
weight to market value in appraisal cases, is quite persuasive. Courts
frequently express a cavalier attitude, if not disdain, for using market
data to establish valuation. The fact that courts take this view is espe-
cially puzzling because the very appraisal professionals to whom
courts defer acknowledge that their job is to determine how the mar-
ket would value a particular asset. Virtually every appraisal report in-
vokes IRS Revenue Ruling 59-196, which defines fair market value as
"the price at which the property would change hands between a will-
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ing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.""
In light of this, Professor Fischel is right to question why courts are so
quick to disregard evidence of what actual willing buyers and willing
sellers are doing in the marketplace.
Courts instead engage in costly, time-consuming, and ultimately
inconclusive valuation exercises, using such valuation metrics as for-
ward and trailing multiples of price to earnings and revenues, book
value and forecasted discounted cash flow models. Such metrics osten-
sibly enable the court to determine how the market "should" price an
asset, without explaining why the market does not in fact attribute
such value. For example, last spring, Harnischfeger Industries, Inc., a
manufacturer of mining equipment, was close to emerging from bank-
ruptcy under a reorganization plan that cancelled the outstanding
stock and gave bondholders equity in place of their bonds. Harnisch-
feger's emergence from bankruptcy was delayed for months by a chal-
lenge brought by equity holders who argued that the value of the on-
going Harnishfeger business exceeded the bondholders' claims. The
bonds of Harnischfeger had consistently traded at approximately fifty
cents on the dollar, which should have indicated that the value of the
business was well below the face value of Harnischfeger's outstanding
debt and that equity holders therefore had no legitimate claim to any
payment in the reorganization. While there was no reason to believe
that the market for these bonds was inefficient, the court nevertheless
delayed confirmation of the plan, allowed wasteful discovery, and held
a trial on the equity holders' frivolous claim.
Indeed, one does not have to be a fervent believer in the efficient
market hypothesis to come to the conclusion that market prices are
the best way to determine the value of an asset. Even if markets mis-
price assets for a sustained period of time, there is no reason to be-
lieve that valuation experts will do a better job. The market reflects
the consensus of willing buyers and sellers, who risk their own capital
based on their views of the value of a given security at a given time.
II. PREMIUM AS A DEFENSETO LIABILITY
Professor Fischel's Article goes beyond his stated thesis, however,
when he applies that thesis to actual cases. In his critique of the Dela-
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ware Supreme Court's decisions in Weinberger v UOP, In and Smith
v Van Gorkom, Professor Fischel does not merely question the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's approach to valuation questions. Instead he
uses the willing seller/willing buyer standard as the basis for a substan-
tive doctrine that protects directors from liability in the context of
corporate takeovers and minority squeezeouts so long as the takeover
or squeezeout occurs at a premium to prevailing market prices. This
theory, if adopted, would radically reshape the landscape of corporate
law, redefine the meaning of fiduciary duty, and deprive shareholders
of an asset that belongs to them.
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a challenge
to a transaction in which Signal, the majority shareholder of UOP,
agreed to buy out the public shareholders. The court concluded that
the UOP directors had not fulfilled their duties to ensure that the mi-
nority shareholders had received a fair price. Professor Fischel argues
that the fact that minority shareholders of UOP received a 50-percent
premium for their shares should be dispositive in determining whether
the directors had fulfilled their fiduciary duties.
Likewise, Professor Fischel argues that the court should have
dismissed "summarily'"7 (which is to say, without taking evidence on
the directors' conduct) the claim in Van Gorkom. In Van Gorkom, the
court held that the directors had failed to inform themselves of the
value of the company before agreeing to a merger. Professor Fischel
criticizes the decision because the "directors acted properly in approv-
ing the merger based on the premium paid over the pre-existing mar-
ket price.' 8 Thus, Professor Fischel argues that the very fact that inves-
tors received a premium in the transactions at issue in Weinberger and
Van Gorkom is sufficient reason to justify the transactions and ab-
solve the directors of any wrongdoing.
To be sure, Weinberger and Van Gorkom seem like easy cases be-
cause the 50-percent premia that their shareholders received were
large; one could argue that the size of a premium is probative evi-
dence that shareholders are not harmed by the directors' conduct. But
this is not what Professor Fischel argues. He focuses on the mere fact
that the shareholders received premia for their shares, not on the sig-
nificance inherent in the magnitude of such premia. But there is no
way to distinguish as a matter of law between premia of 50 percent
and 1 percent. Both are above the market value of the stock-where
buyers and sellers are freely trading-and if that is the measure by
which directors' conduct is adjudged, then there is no coherent way to
5 457 A2d 701 (Del1983).
6 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985).
7 Fischel, 69 U Chi L Rev at 952 (cited in note 1).
8 Id.
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articulate a standard other than the sufficiency of any premium above
market. Thus, under Professor Fischel's analysis, directors would be
immune from liability as long as the shareholder received any pre-
mium, because a minority shareholder should not be entitled to more
than his shares are presently worth in the market place.
Professor Fischel rejects the notion that a shareholder is entitled
to receive more than the market value of her shares as follows:
No such entitlement can be derived from the willing buyer/
willing seller standard, which mandates the opposite result. Minor-
ity status is just as much a characteristic of an investment as the
firm's management or its business strategy, and is equally fac-
tored into the price the investor paid in the first place. No reason
exists why some, but not all, of the economic components of an
investment should be considered when setting its value. '°
Later, in discussing Van Gorkom, Professor Fischel states:
The most charitable interpretation is that the court chastised the
directors for failing to consider the value of the company sold as
a whole rather than focusing on the trading price of a single
share. But, as discussed [in the passage quoted above], this dis-
tinction is specious and, in any event, the market price of shares
also reflects the prospect that the company as a whole will be
sold at a given price."
But the fact that a shareholder's minority status is factored into
the stock price should not exclusively govern how a director conducts
herself in a sale of some or all of a company. The directors have been
charged with the duty to manage the company for the benefit of the
shareholders. When directors agree to a merger, they are in effect sell-
ing a collective asset of the shareholders, namely the potential differ-
ence in the value between the individual shares in the market place
and, depending on the transaction, the minority block (which would
not include a control premium)'2 or the company as a whole (which
would include a control premium). 3
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der Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161,1175-77 & n 40 (1981) (arguing that auctions, like other forms of
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Directors should be expected to conduct themselves as if they
were selling their own asset, in other words, to negotiate hard to get
the best possible deal. Since a court is not equipped to value the asset
and determine an appropriate premium, the best it can do is demand
that the directors undertake the same process that any sensible busi-
nessperson would when selling a business: inform herself about the
available options and negotiate aggressively. In this sense, the Van
Gorkom and Weinberger courts quite appropriately inquired whether
the directors had taken commercially reasonable steps to get a good
deal for their constituents.
Professor Fischel's justification of his position, based on the fact
that the market price of a stock factors in the discounted present
value of a possible takeover into the stock price, is unpersuasive. In
addition to the cash-generating and liquidation value of the assets, the
market price reflects the probability-weighted takeover averages at
which the company may be bought. Significantly, this includes the very
real possibility that the company may not be purchased at all. As the
takeover becomes more likely, however, the increased probability of
the takeover should be reflected in the stock price. But since takeover
negotiations typically are not public, the stock price very likely does
not accurately reflect such probabilities and takeover prices at many
points in time. Professor Fischel's thesis, therefore, proves too much.
Under his theory, directors should never be liable for anything be-
cause director misconduct is factored into the stock price so share-
holders are not hurt when the misconduct actually occurs.
Of course, the real question is not whether the willing
buyer/willing seller standard mandates a rule that immunizes directors
for approving any transaction with a premium. The real question is
whether such a rule is desirable. The answer to that is clearly no. Im-
munizing directors in transactions in which shareholders receive a
premium to the market price of a stock is troublesome because such a
rule would distort share prices. This is true both for mergers, as was
the case in Van Gorkom, and minority squeezeouts, as was the case in
Weinberger.
To see how this distortion will occur, consider a public company
that is controlled by a majority shareholder. The public shareholder
has effectively written a call option to the majority owner, which al-
lows the majority owner to buy the minority shares whenever it wants.
[C]ontrol premiums exist in the financial markets and represent the empirical difference
between (1) prices that buyers are willing to pay for stock that will give a buyer control of a
corporation ("control shares") and (2) prices that buyers are willing to pay for stock that
does not convey control of the corporation ("minority shares").
13 Even though minority shareholders are not ordinarily entitled to a control premium, the
fact is that buyers are willing to pay a premium for large minority blocks.
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If Professor Fischel's view were to prevail, the strike price for this op-
tion is (at the option holder's decision) anywhere above market price
at the time of the exercise. This option has value, at the very least, be-
cause there is a possibility that the holder of the option has non-public
information and would exercise the option opportunistically." Given
that the minority shareholder has effectively written this option to the
majority shareholder, the market price of the minority shares includes
a discount to the underlying value of the stock to reflect the short call
that is embedded in the stock. However, since the call is struck at any
premium above market value, the decrease in the market price of the
stock will increase the value of the call. As Bebchuk and Kahan have
shown persuasively, this phenomenon will cause the stock to spiral
down to the lowest possible value."
Likewise, in the context of a non-majority controlled company,
the fact that the directors are immune from liability so long as they get
any premium will reduce the likelihood that directors will seek the
fullest premium. Simply put, there would be no downside in taking the
first offer that a bidder makes. This in turn will reduce the market
value of stocks, because share prices reflect the possibility of a take-
over at a premium. This will then have the same spiraling effect as in
the squeezeout case, as stock prices reflect the lowered incentives to
seek the greatest premium.
III. ABSURD CONSEQUENCES OF THE PREMIUM RULE
Not only does a rule immunizing directors so long as a transac-
tion receives a premium deprive shareholders of their rightful claim to
a share of the premium on the sale of the company or a large block
thereof, but such a rule could lead to absurd results. Consider the fol-
lowing examples based on the recent stock prices of some publicly
traded companies.
14 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, Adverse Selection and Gains to Control-
lers in Corporate Freezeouts, in Randall K. Morck, ed, Concentrated Corporate Ownership 247,
251 (Chicago 2000) ("A controlling shareholder will generally have private information about
the value of the company that is not available to the public.").
15 See id at 251-52:
[I]f the controlling shareholder has the power to freeze out the minority shareholders by
paying them the prefreezeout market price, she will use that power strategically to effect a
freezeout only if her private information indicates that the value of the minority shares is
above their market price. This strategic use of the power ... results in an adverse selection





In March 2000, 3Com Corporation sold 20 percent of its subsidi-
ary Palm, Inc., in an initial public offering ("IPO") at a price of $38.
The stock price rose dramatically during the initial day of trading,
closing at approximately $95. In the registration statement for the
IPO, 3Com stated its intention to distribute the balance of its stake in
Palm to its shareholders in a tax-free spin-off shortly after the IPO. In
the spin-off, each 3Corn shareholder would receive approximately 1.5
shares of Palm per share of 3Com with no adverse tax or other conse-
quences. 6 Simple multiplication yields the following: At the close of
trading on the day of the Palm IPO, each shareholder of 3Com had
approximately $142.50 worth of Palm stock embedded in each share
of 3Com. Yet, the closing price of 3Com stock on that day was $81.81.
Thus the market implied that the value of all 3Com's assets other than
Palm was negative $60.69.
This situation should have presented an arbitrage opportunity in
which an investor could have bought 3Com shares, sold short 1.5 Palm
shares, and locked in a profit (upon distribution of the Palm shares)
equal, at the very least, to the negative implied value of 3Com. Had
this arbitrage been possible, in all likelihood the shares of Palm and
3Com would have converged so that 3Com would not have had an
implied negative value. In fact this did not happen because it was very
difficult to execute a short sale of Palm, as it was impossible to borrow
Palm stock, a necessary prerequisite to a short sale. As a result, the
negative value of 3Com's non-Palm assets persisted for months, not, as
finance theory would assume, minutes.
Imagine that during the period that the implied value of 3Com's
assets other than its Palm stock was negative, the board of directors of
3Com agreed to a merger at a price that was below the implied value
of its Palm holdings ($142.50 plus any value associated with the 3Com
assets) but above the then-prevailing 3Com price. Management would
then be selling 3Com for a "premium," but for $60 less than the value
of its Palm holdings (to say nothing of the value of the rest of its busi-
ness)! Under Professor Fischel's view, the directors would be immune
from challenge. Indeed, this would be true even if the board of direc-
tors agreed to pay management to take the business off their hands.
Despite this absurd outcome, the case would be, to borrow Professor
Fischel's term, a "no-brainer."
16 For news reports covering this transaction, see Marisa Torrieri, 3Com Still in Running
Despite Palm's Jumpstart, Wireless Data News (Mar 15,2000); 3Com Launches Palm IPO, Bus
Wire (Mar 2, 2000); Scott Thurm, Palm, Inc Gets Ready for New Hands, val St J BI (Feb 28,
200o).
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B. Terra ADR/Ordinary Shares
Likewise, in May 2000, as the Internet bubble was bursting, Terra
Network S.A., a Spanish Internet company controlled by the Spanish
telecom giant, Telef6nica S.A., agreed to acquire Lycos, Inc., a U.S.-
based Internet portal company.17 Terra's shares trade both in Spain
and the United States (in the form of American Depository Receipts,
or ADRs). Both the ordinary shares and the ADRs represent identical
claims on the assets of Terra. Under the agreement, shareholders of
Lycos were to receive Terra stock, either in ordinary shares or ADRs,
at the shareholders' election, in exchange for their Lycos shares.
Typically, Terra's ordinary shares and ADRs trade at very similar
(currency-adjusted) prices. This makes sense because they represent
identical claims to the same assets and ADRs can be exchanged into
ordinary shares at the holders' election. If the share prices of the
ADRs and ordinary shares deviate in value, there is an arbitrage op-
portunity, and the market should quickly bring the prices of the two
securities back in line with each other. '8 For example, if the ordinary
shares trade at a higher currency-adjusted value than the ADRs, an
arbitrageur can buy the ADRs, sell short the ordinary shares, hedge
the currency risk, convert the ADRs into ordinary shares, cover the
short position with the converted shares, and lock in a riskless profit
net of transaction costs. But after the Lycos merger was announced,
this mechanism for maintaining parity between the ordinary shares
and ADRs stopped functioning.
Typically when a merger is announced, the stock of the target
trades at a discount to the value that the stockholders will receive at
the close of the merger. This discount is generally a function of the
time that it will take for the merger to close and the risk of the lost
premium if it does not close. To capture this discount, or spread, in a
stock for stock merger, arbitrageurs buy shares of the target of the
merger and sell short an appropriate number of shares of the acquir-
ing company, thereby locking in the discount or spread because the
target shares will be converted into shares of the acquirer if the
merger closes as anticipated.
In the wake of the announcement of the Terra/Lycos merger, the
shares of Terra in the United States began to trade at an enormous (as
17 For news reports discussing the Terra Network-Lycos transaction, see Kara Swisher,
Boom Town: Lycos Chief's New Strategy: Yankee, Go Abroad, Wall St J B1 (May 22,2000); Wid-
liam Lewis, Terra Closes on Lycos Takeover, Fin Times 1 (May 15, 2000).
18 Differences in share prices between related securities that trade in different market
places do not always trade in line. For a fascinating discussion of this subject, see Kenneth A.
Froot and Emil M. Dabora, How Are Stock Prices Affected by the Location of Trade?, 53 J Fin




large as 30 percent) discount to the shares in Spain, even though the
ADRs represented a claim to the same assets. What was the reason for
this discount? As a result of the announcement of the merger, it be-
came very difficult to borrow shares of Terra in Spain, so merger arbi-
trageurs who were buying Lycos and selling short Terra to capture the
spread were short-selling the Terra ADRs, thereby driving down the
price of Terra shares. Since it was impossible to short sell the Spanish
shares, there was no arbitrage mechanism to bring the Terra shares
back into line with the ADRs. Once the merger closed, the discount
between the ADRs and ordinary shares disappeared.
To highlight the anomaly that would result under Professor
Fischel's approach, imagine if Telef6nica, the majority shareholder of
Terra, had decided to freeze out the minority shares at a price in be-
tween the price of the U.S. shares and the Spanish shares. Under Pro-
fessor Fischel's suggested rule, the U.S. shareholders would have
lacked a legal claim against Telef6nica, as they received a premium
over the value of their shares. The Spanish holders, however, would
have had a legal claim. This would seem to be an anomalous result, as
the U.S. holders and Spanish holders are in a perfectly equivalent posi-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Professor Fischel correctly argues that courts should be more
willing to consider market evidence in reaching decisions on valua-
tion. But his argument is weaker when he expands that thesis to argue
that market evidence should govern substantive rules of director li-
ability. As I have tried to show, the rule he advocates would be disad-
vantageous to shareholders. Moreover, market evidence is sometimes
inconclusive and can lead to absurd results. One could infer from the
examples that I have cited that markets are not always efficient in the
short run. Thus, Professor Fischel's suggestion that courts rely entirely
on market evidence would gut the fiduciary duties of directors, distort
stock prices, and could lead to absurd results in those situations where
markets have not instantly assimilated all relevant information.
Hence, Professor Fischel's rule should not be adopted by the courts of
Delaware, or any other court.
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